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Abstract
Trust acts as a facilitator for decision making in environments, where decisions are subject to risk and
uncertainty. Security is one of the factors contributing to the trust model that is a requirement for service
users. In this paper we ask, What can be done to improve end user trust in choosing a cloud identity
provider? Security and privacy are central issues in a cloud identity environment and it is the end user
who determines the amount of trust they have in any identity system. This paper is an in-depth literature
survey that evaluates identity service delivery in a cloud environment from the perspective of the service
user. A trust framework is sought that will provide the end user the capability of evaluating the trust
they may have in any service. The analysis resolves the possibility of a single trust value that gives an
overall security strength of the cloud identity service. Such a metric can provide informed end user
choice. Consideration is also given to the decay or enhancement of the trust value based on user
experience and transactions over a period of time.
Keywords Trust, Identity, End user, Frameworks, Metrics
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1 Introduction
A trust management framework for assessing the trustworthiness of a cloud identity provider can be
developed that aggregates and manages trust-related information from different sources within and
without the cloud environment. The proposal is based on the analysis and improvement of existing work,
and has a systematic design that helps the cloud end users to find the particular provider that fulfils their
requirements. This work differentiates from previous trust management publications, for example Noor
et al. (2013), and Roy et al. (2015), by assessing trust for cloud identity management from the perspective
of the end-user. Noor et al., (2016) argue that trust and reputation are indispensable conditions for the
social conviviality in human societies. Cloud federation environments has similar conditions for
interaction where cloud users can join and leave an identity provider frequently. , However, traditional
trust solutions have structural difficulties when applied to a cloud environment (Habib, Hauke, Ries, &
Mühlhäuser, 2012). Due to the subjective and context-sensitive nature of trust the selection of a cloud
provider with fully trusted and appropriate services is one of the most challenging issues in the multitenant cloud environment (Ray, Ray, & Chakraborty, 2009). Often Cloud providers have many services
that are hosted and tiered for multiple users. As a consequence there can be a variation of services by
the one provider. All of these matters impact upon an end user trust level and the decision for use.
Further complications arise as the end user looks for evidence on which to make a decision. Trust
relationships between entities in cloud computing are dynamic, uncertain and hard to quantify
(Pearson, 2013). The decision maker has to take ownership of the risk and to draw a judgement based
on wide variation. The Trust models for cloud identity providers often do not allow for such uncertainty
and require improvement by increasing the number of specific attributes taken into account that are
relevant when selecting cloud identity providers (Shaikh & Sasikumar, 2015). Common decisions tend
to choose the most credible node under one single factor, but ignore the other factors that provide
evidence of actual transactions. Such decision-making often lacks a mechanism to evaluate different
cloud entities’ different quality of service (QoS) requirements (Zheng, Wu, Zhang, Lyu, & Wang, 2013).
Furthermore, cloud has many unique features compared to traditional environments that require tools
for evaluation before trustworthy evidence can be accumulated, evaluated, and decisions made. In this
sense there is a gap to be filled with regard to evidence available to end users for decision-making in
cloud environments.
Central to the concern is how to compare each Cloud service based on an agreed set of attributes, and
then how to quantify and aggregate them with a meaningful metric (Oliveira et al., 2014). The
combination of information from different sources demands multiple criteria decision making (MCDM)
(Ramesh & Zionts, 2013). This often requires decision-makers to choose or rank alternatives on the basis
of an evaluation of several criteria. Hence, decision making involves managing trade-offs or
compromises among a number of criteria that are in conflict with each other (Garg, Versteeg, & Buyya,
2013). The method is related to how much customization should be supported and where the trust values
should be aggregated. In the case of QoS, several challenges are found in constructing the model for
evaluation and ranking of Cloud identity providers. To establish and measure a Cloud Identity
Measurement Index (CIMI) a set of attributes requires continuous updating and adjustment for
variation over time. However, without having precise measurement models for each attribute, it is not
possible to compare different CSMI. The second challenge is how to rank the Cloud identity based on
CIMI attributes. There are two types of QoS requirements which a user can have: functional and nonfunctional. Some of them cannot be measured easily given the nature of the Cloud environments.
Attributes like security and user experience are difficult to quantify. Moreover, to decide which service
matches with all the functional and non-functional requirements is a decision problem. It is necessary
to think critically before selection, apply the multiple criteria and preserve the independence of
relationships. Subsequently, the assigning of weights to trust attributes is necessary in the building of a
trust model (Benlian & Hess, 2011).
This introduction section has scoped the problem context and the remainder of the paper is structured
to define cloud computing and its related Security, trust and privacy issues. Cloud identity management
is then review so that trust models and their mechanisms may be evaluated. To conclude, sixteen
currently available trust frameworks are analysed to deliver potential solutions for a singular metric and
an end user system architecture for decision-making.

2 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing integrates various computing technologies to provide services to the end users (Wei et
al., 2014). Efficient use of businesses resources is one of the main advantages of cloud computing. The
charging of the “pay as you use” model is an attractive option for businesses who wish to reduce the cost
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of assets and related personnel costs (Aleem & Ryan Sprott, 2012). Cloud computing permits services to
be marketed independent of technologies and vendor’s so that an end user may efficiently and
economically choose, which and what service best suits them (Ali, Khan, & Vasilakos, 2015). The price
driver of cloud computing has impacted on even the more recent business models and has initiated fresh
rounds of restructuring. The global reach of such opportunities has brought with it concerns regarding
security, privacy, monitoring, and trust. These challenges are being taken up by the research community,
and solutions are being made available for industry and end users that have negotiated an optimal
payback from the resources being invested. A full review of these issues and analysis may be found in
Ardqggna & Etisalat (2015).
The NIST definition (NIST, 2013) of cloud computing is widely used to define the concept. In figure 1
the cloud computing scope has four separate descriptions of service provisioning which are common
characteristics, essential characteristics, service models, and deployment models.

Figure1: Deployment descriptions for cloud (NIST, 2013)
The five essential features of cloud computing differentiate the concept from traditional grid computing
by including the scope of Broad network access. This essential characteristic opens the computing grid
to a World Wide Web of services. The concept makes available resource pooling, and on-demand selfservice, within an economic model that is termed Measured Service. The NIST definition provides a
scope of what to expect in cloud computing. However the way the definition is interpreted and
implemented is entirely up to a service provider. This is where the key issues and challenges arise. To
the end user each of these essential characteristics are desirable and useful for economic advantage.
However the service provider has to also act in their own interest to maintain their business in the face
of competition and technical challenges. The result can be that the end user may not experience the
service they expect. In addition to the NIST description scope, others have developed deployment
models that best suit their conception of a commercial opportunity. For example, Alhamazani et al.
(2015) described one particular approach named Anything-as-a-Service (XaaS) , which refers to the fact
that cloud systems are able to support and offer anything, or everything, in the form of services, ranging
from large resources to personal, specific, and granular requirements. Examples include Trust-as-aService (TaaS), Identity-as-a-Service (IDaaS), Data-as-a-Service (DaaS), Routing-as-a-Service (RaaS),
and Security-as-a-Service (SecaaS). The implication of these developments is for a growing scope of what
may be described as cloud computing. The NIST (2013) definition provides adequate scope to be robust
in the face of an unfolding concept.

2.1 Cloud Security Issues
Cloud security increases the complexity of traditional computing systems protection by adding multiple
layers of design and potential opportunity for vulnerability (Goode et al., 2015). The standard CIA
criteria are still required. This implies that a combination of confidentiality, in the prevention of the
unauthorized disclosure of information, is required. Integrity, and the prevention of the unauthorized
amendment or deletion of information, is required. Similarly the Availability of services and the
prevention of the unauthorized withholding of information, is also required (Cabarcos et al., 2012).
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Bezzi, Kalavan & Sabetta (2011) resolved security issues in cloud computing environments into six subcategories, which include:
•

How to provide safety mechanisms to monitor or trace the cloud server.

•

How to keep data confidentiality for individuals and sensitivity.

•

How to avoid a malicious insider’s illegal operations through the potential lack of
transparency into provider process and procedure environments.

•

How to avoid service hijacking, where phishing, fraud and exploitation are well known
issues in IT

•

How to manage multi-instances in multi-tenancy virtual environments, when all instances
are assumed isolated from each other. However, the assumption breaks down when
attackers are able to cross virtual machines. Using side channels they can escape the
boundaries of the sandboxed environment and have full access to a host.

•

How to develop appropriate law and implement legal jurisdiction, so that users have a chain
of evidence against their providers when required.

The survey by Aleem & Sprott, (2012) showed that the top concerns for organizations regarding cloud
computing were security, governance and a lack of control over service availability. The survey
highlighted that the majority of IT professionals were not aware that some CSPs currently control the
decryption keys that enable them to decrypt their client’s data. It could be considered as a major security
concern and it is one of the factors that should be looked into at service level agreement (SLA) level.
Data loss and leakage were nominated as the top threat to cloud computing by respondents; this was
followed by account, service and traffic hijacking.

2.2 Cloud Privacy Issues
Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to control themselves or information about themselves
and thereby reveal themselves selectively. Privacy issues in cloud computing environments can be
divided into three sub-categories, which include (Nepal & Pathan, 2014):
•

When a subject may be more concerned about the current or future information being revealed
than information from the past.

•

When a user may be comfortable if friends can manually request his information, but may not
want alerts sent automatically.

•

A Cloud user may rather have the information reported as an ambiguous region rather than a
precise point.

In addition, the privacy issues differ according to different cloud scenarios (Xiao & Xiao, 2013), and can
be divided into four subcategories as follows:
•

How to make users remain control over their data when it is stored and processed in the cloud,
and avoid theft, nefarious use and unauthorized resale.

•

How to guarantee data replications are in a fixed jurisdiction, a consistent state, and has no data
loss, leakage and unauthorized modification or fabrication.

•

Identification of the party that is responsible for ensuring legal requirements for personal
information.

•

Cloud sub-contractors involved in processing can be identified, checked and verified.

2.3 Cloud Trust Issues
Trust is a measurable belief that utilizes experience, to make decisions. It is used in social science in
constructing a human relationship and is now an essential substitute for forming security
mechanisms in distributed computing environments. It has many soft security attributes, such as,
reliability, dependability, confidence, honesty, belief, trustfulness, security, competence, and so on
(Manuel, 2015). The security concern has different levels of trust in the different deployment models
of cloud computing, due to the difference levels of trust among the communicating parties (Shaikh
& Sasikumar, 2015). Trust in the private cloud computing model is expected to be at the highest
level as the infrastructure and the assets will be managed and used by specific and well-known

4

Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2016, University of Wollongong

Cusack and Ghazizadeh
Cloud Identity Issues

entities. In the community cloud computing model, the cloud consumers (CCs) are from different
organizations, and they will have the same level of security requirements. The trust level here may
be lesser than the trust level in the private cloud, yet it is still better than the public cloud model.
The problem of trust is in the public cloud computing model, in which the communication entities
are unknown to each other is critical for transaction. However, it is the service provider’s
responsibility to build trust with its clients. Trust is the most complex relationship among entities
because it is extremely subjective, context-dependent, non-symmetric, uncertain, and partially
transitive (Chann & Chieu, 2010). Trust evaluation is a multi-faceted and multi-phased
phenomenon based on multi-dimensional factors and the trust evaluation cycle. It is used to find
the answer to the question “With which service providers should I interact and with which I should
not?”
Trust issues in cloud computing environments can be divided into four sub-categories (Bezzi,
Kalavuri & Sabetta, (2011) which include:
•

How to define and evaluate trust according to the unique attributes in cloud computing
environments.

•

How to handle malicious information when trust relationships in clouds are temporary and
dynamic.

•

How to consider and provide a different security level for service according to the trust
degree.

•

How to manage trust degree change with interaction time and context, and to monitor,
adjust, and to accurately reflect the trust relationship dynamic.

2.4 Cloud Monitoring Issues
Cloud Computing has a number of positive aspects pushing for its rapid adoption, from both the
economic and the technical perspectives (Tormo, Marmol & Perez, 2012). The Cloud provides a
lower Total Cost of Ownership, and increased flexibility in terms of both resources and Service Level
Agreements. It allows for the focusing on the core business, by ignoring the costs related to
infrastructure management. It also provides an improved scalability, ubiquitous access to data and
resources, and advanced disaster recovery mechanisms. Together with these positive aspects Cloud
Computing has a number of challenges for which the research community and industry are investing
resources. Monitoring issues in cloud computing environments can be divided into four subcategories (Dondio & Longo, 2011). The requirement is for accurate and fine-grained monitoring,
platforms and measurement techniques.
•

How to best monitor and measure provision of scalability, load balancing, Quality of Service
(QoS), service continuity and application performance.

•

How to guarantee SLAs.

•

How to realize best measurement for management of large scale, complex and federated
infrastructures.

•

How to evaluate the root causes of end-to-end performance.

3 Cloud Identity
Effective cloud management recognises the need to use identity and advanced identity management
mechanisms to overcome many of the issues noted in section 2. Identity management systems provide
authentication and authorization based on end user identities. They keep privacy, while at the same time
provide interoperability across multiple domains. Traditional identity management systems allow the
end users, to some extent, to manage their personal information for accessing certain services. However,
cloud computing brings a different perspective related to the end users’ interests. Additionally, end users
are more concerned about who can access their data. Identity management systems have been shown to
be secure and efficient in diverse contexts and scenarios. By establishing trust relationships between
providers and domains, identity management systems offer a huge range of features both for end users
and for organizations regarding controlling and exchanging identity-related information while
maintaining the privacy (Fang et al., 2012).
The user-centricity and privacy-preserving features offered by identity management systems, are key
elements in cloud computing environments. Cloud computing integrates technologies and concepts
from other fields, such as multi party computation, distributed systems, federation, and so on; and hence
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some of the issues have already been addressed in other contexts, where identity management systems
have been widely accepted (Fito & Guitant, 2014). Nevertheless, cloud computing brings a different
perspective related to the end users interests, and delivers new risks for end user identities. Additionally,
end users are more concerned about how their data is managed, where it is located and who can access
it. In this sense, cloud computing is changing some of the basic assumptions (Fournaris & Keramidas,
2014).
To ensure the security of critical and sensitive data for customers the trust between Cloud identity
providers has to be established before redirecting the customer's requests from one identity provider to
another provider. Among all the cloud security issues, the ability to generate a trust value metric for
identity management in the cloud is the most helpful to the end user. It is desirable that the users in one
domain are able to access applications hosted in other clouds when a trust relationship already exists
between the two cloud environments. Therefore, functionalities to manage the flow of user identity
across clouds or domains are required. For this reason, a robust identity management (authentication,
authorization and attribute data) must be put in place for cloud deployment and interaction in a usable
and secure way. Likewise, the need for better access control and identity management systems as a main
target for Federated Identity Management (FIM) plays a vital role in allowing the global scalability that
is required for the successful implantation of cloud technologies. Current FIM frameworks are limited
by the relative complexity of the underlying trust models and the complexity of the problem. Current
FIM systems lack mechanisms to achieve dynamic federation, which is still an open challenge that
requires further investigation (Garg et al., 2013). Thus, the establishment of dynamic federations
between the different cloud identity actors is still a major theoretical challenge that has remained
unsolved.

3.1 Cloud Identity Management System
Identity management systems were designed with the aim of providing an access control architecture,
capable of preserving the users’ privacy and enabling Single Sign-On by establishing trust relationships
between different organizations. Shibboleth (Ghazizadeh, et al. (2014) and Liberty Alliance (Habib et
al., 2012) are widely extended examples of identity management systems. In these systems, users’
information is stored on reliable entities, named identity providers. Identity providers are in charge of
managing users’ identities, releasing required information to external entities. Service providers
delegate the authentication process to identity providers, which in turn respond by sending the users’
information on successful authentication. Additionally, they enable Single Sign-On, allowing users to
access different services using their unique account. A set of commonly used mechanisms are reviewed
below. The different approaches show the benefits of each in regards to the cloud identity system access.
The federation establishment requires a metadata provider exchange; where the metadata contains
identifiers, public key certificates, and service attributes. They are used for the location and secure
communication between provider services. This decoupling between providers enables that IdPs can
support many SPs in a distributed fashion, and also focus on managing identities, access control policies,
and security token issuing.
The OAuth mechanism defines a protocol in order for clients to access server resources on behalf of a
resource owner (Habib et al., 2012). It provides a process for end users to authorize third-party accesses
to their server resources without sharing their credentials. Windows CardSpacealso known as its
codename InfoCard, is the Microsoft client or Identity Selector for the Identity Metasystem (Habiba et
al., 2014). Taking into consideration that the end users may have different identities depending on the
context where they are interacting, the challenge of this approach is to allow the end users to create, use,
and manage their diverse digital identities in an understandable and effective way. The idea behind
Windows CardSpace is that end users could manage their digital identities, and their related attributes,
in a similar way that they manage their cards in their wallets. When end users create an account in an
OpenID identity provider, they receive an identifier as a URL or XRI. Then, when they access a relying
party or service provider website which requires authentication and supports OpenID, they may enter
their identifier in order to be redirected to their OpenID provider (Kanwal et al., 2014).
Yang et al. (2010) have an open source identity framework designed to enhance the end user experience,
by integrating identity profiles and social relationships information across multiple sites. It not only
manages end users’ attributes, but it also manages data flows to external businesses and to other end
users’ personal data service. Luhmann (2000) is a cryptographic technology which presents a type of
credential or token to encode end users’ attributes in such a way that the issuance and the presentation
of such tokens remains un-linkable. The technology makes use of Zero-knowledge proof methods to
issue the tokens so that an end user can prove possession of a certain piece of information without
revealing the information. Luo et al. (2012) is an anonymous credential system following the protocols
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in order to allow the end users to control the dissemination of personal information and preserving their
privacy. It allows where an end user can obtain credentials containing attested attributes from identity
providers, and prove to a service provider the validity of such attributes without revealing any other
information. OpenID Connect (Manuel, 2015) is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol.
It allows Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an
Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the end user in an
interoperable and accurate manner. The functionality and workflow is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: OpenID Connect General workflow (Manuel, 2015, p.14)
In the common workflow of SAML (Needleman, 2004), an end user wants to access a service from a
service provider, but this service provider needs to authenticate the end user and obtain some attributes
about the user. The authentication process, instead of being performed by the service provider, is
delegated to the identity provider, which is in charge of managing the user’s identity.

4 Trust Model and Mechanisms
Security is the dominant term when it comes to protection of sensitive data, but trust is a much stronger
concept that goes beyond confidentiality, availability, integrity, and nonrepudiation (the basic security
pillars). Trust formulates a good-faith relationship between computing machines as well as between
their users. From the IT perspective, trust is not only about securing the communication channel or
authenticating the data sender but also on trusting that the sent information are legitimate, they do not
include malicious codes and they will not harm the receiver in an unforeseen way. In other words, trust
extends to the sender itself by believing that they will obey to specific communication rules and will not
abuse communication by non-responsiveness or selfish behavior (Napal & Pathan, 2014).
Trust and Reputation Rahman & Hailes (1998) are two indisputably recognised and relevant factors in
human societies. Studies of trust have been carried out in different fields: psychology, sociology,
economy and philosophy. Computational models of trust emerged in the last decade with the aim of
exploiting the human notion of trust in open and decentralized environments. According to Noor &
Sheng (2011), trust is adopted by humans to decrease the complexity of the society we are living by using
delegation. Trust has emerged as a key element in decision-support solutions by helping agents in the
selection of good and trustworthy collaborative partners, in the identification of reliable pieces of
information or as part of soft-security applications. Trust is a concept borrowed from the human society
and has different definitions in different fields. Properties of trust also vary from context to context.
Here are some extracted properties commonly applied in computer science. Trust, in general, is not
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transitive (non-transitive). Namely, if agent A trusts B and B trusts C, it is not possible to conclude that
A also trusts C. However, under some conditions, A can trust C (Pagliere & Castlelfranchi, 2014).
Secondly, trust is typically asymmetric. A member may trust another member more than she (he) is
trusted back. However, when both parties are trustworthy, they will come to a high mutual trust level
after repeated interactions. Conversely, if one of the members does not act in a trustworthy manner, the
other member will be forced to penalize him/her, leading to low mutual trust. Asymmetry can be
considered a particular case of personalization (Paglieri, 2013). Thirdly, trust value may change over
time as a dynamic factor. The most recent value of trust is more informative and persuasive in decisionmaking. Due to the dynamic behaviour of agents, the trustworthiness of an agent may change over time.
Thus, it needs to be updated. Fourthly, trust is subjective and self-reinforcing dynamic which means
when a cloud user chooses to trust or distrust a provider, it is a personal choice. Each user has its own
preference or interests (subjectivity) that influence their trust reasoning (Qu, Wang & Orgun, 2013).
Finally, trust is context-aware. It means different scenarios have different types of trust (Radha & Reddy,
2012).
A typical computational trust solution follows the high-level architecture shown in (Sakimura et al.,
2014). In a typical distributed environment, an agent (trustier) is acting in a domain where the trustier
needs to trust other agents or objects, whose ability and reliability are unknown. The trustier agent
queries the trust system to gather more knowledge about the trustee agent and in order to better ground
decisions. A trust-based decision in a specific domain is a multi-stage process. The first step is the
identification and selection of the appropriate input data. These data are in general domain-specific and
identified through an analysis conducted over the application.
Evidence selection is driven by an underlying trust model that contains the notion of trust on which the
entire system is centred. A trust model represents the intelligence used to justify which elements are
selected as trust evidence, why some elements are selected and other discarded, and it informs the
computation over the selected evidence. A trust model contains the definition of the notion of trust, its
dynamics, how it evolves over time and with new evidences, and the mechanisms of trust used in the
computation. After evidence selection, a trust computation is performed over evidence to produce trust
values. This is the estimation of the trustworthiness of entities in a particular domain. A trust
computation requires the formalization of a computable version of those mechanisms defined in the
trust model. Examples of such mechanisms are the past-outcomes, reputation and recommendation,
but also temporal and social factors, similarity, and categorization. For instance, a classical trust system
uses two sets of evidence: recommendations and past experience. Each of them is quantified separately
and then aggregated into a final value. In this final aggregation stage, exogenous factors such as risk and
trustier’ s disposition can also be considered. The output is presented as quantitative trust values and as
a set of justifications.

4.1 Evaluation of System Architecture
The components of the trust framework adapted from Shaikh & Sasikumar, (2013) are in figure 3. In
order to generate successful collaborated applications, a trust mechanism is incorporated. A node’s trust
value is assessed based on direct observations and indirect information from recommendations. The
trust of one node toward another node is updated upon an encounter and interaction events. Each node
will execute the trust protocol independently and will perform its direct trust assessment toward an
encountered node based on specific detection mechanisms designed for assessing the trust property.
This framework provides features such as service selection based on trust requirements and ranking of
distributed computing based on previous user experiences and real time performance. The key elements
are:
•

Cloud entities: This component is responsible for interaction with customers and
understanding their application needs, and performs discovery and ranking of suitable
trusted services using other components such as the trust management, direct/indirect trust
and evaluation method.

•

Monitoring and history information: this component first discovers services that can satisfy
users’ needs. Then, it closely monitors the trust performance of the services, such as direct
and indirect trust. At the same time, related history records are stored in service database.

•

Computing service network structure and catalogue: builds the service network and their
features advertised by various different providers, divides computing resources into
different classes.
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Figure 3: Service Trust Evaluation System Architecture (adapted from Shaikh & Sasikumar, 2013)

4.2 Trust Establishment
The taxonomies for functional and non-functional features in a trust model (Schryen et al., 2011) can be
used as an assessment criterion to evaluate the existing trust models in the Cloud domain. The nonfunctional features include, security, performance, control, and deployment of the model. The functional
features include the agreements made, certificates issued, feedback given, domain of operation, and the
subjectivity of the decision-making model. Service level agreement (SLA) based trust model (STM)
(Shaikh & Sasikumar, 2013) and Trust model for security aware Cloud (TMSAW) (Shaikh & Sasikumar,
2015) are two examples of the agreement-based trust models which the SLA plays a primary role in trust
evaluation of cloud service providers. In the STM, the SLA agents are responsible for asserting the
required parameters of encryption and key management, hence providing data confidentiality. The SLAmanagement module in SLA-agent is responsible for creating and negotiating the access control policies
for data stored in the Cloud, thus guaranteeing the data ownership to customers. This model does not
encounter any procedure to assure the process execution control, which is an important attribute for
elevating the trust level on a CSP. In addition, the SLA-agent manages and inserts the necessary
parameters for data replication in SLAs, thus assuring data availability. The Trust management module
collects feedback (from external Cloud providers) that is used to analyse the QoS transparency offered
by a specific CSP. Detection of malicious entities is obtained via credibility weights, which are assigned
to the sources of information and the aggregated value is calculated. SLA-agents need to design and
select the required parameters for the SLAs while creation and management related tasks are performed
by the CSP. The functionality of the model can be enhanced by introducing a new module that can be
easily integrated with SLA reports to obtain better and more reliable trust values, and high flexibility.
The STM does not support a dynamic update of the SLA parameters and is, therefore, considered to be
passive for the Cloud environment. The model is capable of evaluating the Cloud services, but does not
facilitate the trust evaluation of the Cloud consumers and therefore, does not support the dual root of
trust. Nevertheless, the parameter monitoring module of the SLA agent continuously observes and
monitors the SLA attributes to avoid any inconsistency and inaccuracy in the trust score formulation.
Ahmed et al. have proposed a Ticket-based trust model (TTM) to establish trust on the Cloud providers.
TTMs are issued by the data owner for authorized users, where capability lists (user-id, data-id, access
rights AR) define the access rights of users on data stored on the Cloud, thus assuring the data ownership
offered by the CSP. The model does not provide any mechanism to ensure the process execution control
in the Cloud. Likewise, no mechanism is adopted to evaluate the QoS transparency presented by the
CSP. A Certification-based trust model (CTM) [48] does not provide any mechanism to assure the
process execution control and the QoS transparency. Moreover, the dynamic composition of services
introduces high complexity in implementation of the discovery framework. The required number of
Cloud services can be examined and validated from the certificates issued by accreditation authorities,
thus introducing high flexibility in the model. Moreover, the framework can select the Cloud service
accredited by third parties to satisfy the data replication that assures data availability.
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5 Trust Frameworks
Selecting the best cloud service from the available cloud providers is a complex and challenging task for
the cloud users. There is a multitude of works that employ optimization to achieve this goal. However
they limit the applicability of the method to generalise and usually require select input data that
structures a view of a current situation. Other models are required that can compensate for many of the
ambiguity is found in cloud environments. For the end user to identify trustworthy cloud services is
difficult because much of the evidence is not available to them. Consequently the concept of the trust
framework in which generalise guidelines and specific metrics are found can be a useful tool in this type
of decision-making. Table 1 provides an analysis from literature of trust frameworks into six categories:
risk, authentication, security, accuracy, integration, and privacy.
Trust Framework

Risk

Authenticati
on

Security

Accuracy

Integration

Privacy

QL

A

SC,SA

N

N

N

al.,

QL

N

SA

N

N

PP.PC

Theoharidou et al.,
2013.

QQ

N

SC

N

N

PC

Tormo et al., 2014.

QQ

A

SC,SA

N

N

PP,PC

Vullers
2013.

QL

N

SA

N

N

N

Wagle et al., 2015.

QL

Ni

SA,SC

AF,AA
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N

N
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N

N
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Zhuang et al., 2010.
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A
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N

N

N

Schryen et al., 2011.

N

N
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I

PP

Zheng et al., 2013.

N

N
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I

N

Qu et al., 2013

N

N

SC

AF

I

N

Fang, et al., 2012.
Tanimoto
2011.

et

&

&

Alpar,

Table 1. Comparison of existing cloud trust frameworks (Mnemonics in text)
The first category of analysis is risk. Different trust frameworks supply a different conception and
methodologies for the calculation of risk. For example, the approaches can be grouped under the three
risk assessment methods: quantitative (QN), qualitative (QL), and semi-quantitative (QQ). The second
category for analysis is Authentication (A). These mechanisms are used to establish consumers’
identities when registering for a service. The analysis of these mechanisms give evidence on which to
make a trust based decision. The third category is Security (S). The security mechanisms employed by a
cloud service also hint at its trustworthiness. An assessment requires appropriate security mechanisms
at both the access control (SA) and communication (SC) levels. Privacy (P) is another factor in
determining the trustworthiness of a service. Knowing a cloud service’s privacy policy can help
determine whether to trust that service with essential data. Based on SLAs, privacy responsibility can be
split between the provider (PP), who deploys all necessary security measures, and consumers (PC), who
take their own steps to preserve data privacy. The fourth criteria is Accuracy. The accuracy of trust
assessment depends on both the correct identification of trust feedback and effective assessment
function security. Poor identification of trust feedback (AF) and/or failure to prevent attackers (AA)
from manipulating trust results can lead to inaccurate results in trust management systems. Combining
several techniques like reputation and recommendations can increase trust results’ accuracy; Integrity
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(I) may also lead to better trust results by matching appropriate consumers to trustworthy providers
(Toromo, Marmol & Perez, 2014).
These criteria have been used to evaluate representative trust management systems for cloud computing
and related areas such as grid, P2P, and service-oriented computing. The analysis yielded several open
research challenges. Cloud users are the real owner of the data assets, thus, ignoring their business
objective will result in an inaccurate evaluation of cloud provider trust level. The most popular risk
assessment standards, such as NIST SP800-30 assume that an organization’s assets are fully managed
by the organization itself. This is not the case for cloud computing model. Moreover, a big problem today
is that, all too often, different CSPs or CIdPs employ their own jargon to describe risk, while at the same
time measuring its impact and the probability that it will manifest itself is expressed in a subjective
fashion. Therefore, as a starting point, risk assessment will bring a common framework for managing
different types of risk in the same way.

6 Discussion
Cloud computing involves many security risks, which may require the re-evaluation against a new set of
criteria. Therefore, security risk assessment in cloud computing requires further research to develop an
appropriate risk assessment methodology. For scalability reasons, trust relationships between the CIdP,
CIdU, CSP should be assessed as on-demand instead of statically. Such a move would bring quality
improvement to the methods currently applied for Cloud identity. However, there is a high uncertainty
component when deciding whether to cooperate or not with unknown providers. Hence, there is an
ongoing project to identify the risks associated with the Cloud computing paradigm. Risks associated
with the virtualization technology, such as failures in multi-tenancy, virtual machine (VM) isolation, and
hypervisor vulnerabilities; loss of direct control of resources and software such as provider lock-in,
decreased reliability since providers may go out of business, agreement (SLA) breaches; risks associated
with data such as data protection responsibility, insecure or incomplete data deletion; and legal risks
such as regulatory compliance, data location, and the effect of international boundaries on operation:
are some of the risks that cloud computing has introduced. Thus, every CIdU has to make decisions that
imply dealing with some form of risk. CIdU may request evidence to determine if it is secure to
collaborate with a particular unknown CIdPs.
The end user trust can be improved when choosing an identity service by greater transparency and
clarity on the part of the CIdP. Similarly, a CSP has to decide if it is sufficiently secure to accept
authentication statements or other identity data issued by a specific CIdP. It is also crucial that users are
aware of the transactions regarding their identity. In fact, they should be provided with risk information
to determine if they should reveal their personal data to the CSP or CIdP. Public-key infrastructure
(PKI), access management services, Rule-based access control, password based protection, and Secure
Shell (SSH) are examples for cloud authentication from which vital evidence may be gained to populate
the trust model. Further differentiation is required of the applicability of trust assessment functions for
each service provider. A greater number of authentication types equates with a high level of trust.
Most of the trust models reviewed do not use any mechanism to identify authentic trust feedback. This
is a significant challenge in the cloud because of the overlapping interactions between service providers
and consumers. Also most of the trust management systems have been analyzed do not have a
mechanism to preserve participants’ privacy, highlighting the urgent need for efficient techniques that
protect users’ privacy while minimizing the impact to system performance. Importantly, most of the
trust management systems examined do not support the integration of trust feedback for the end user
to view. Techniques that can efficiently integrate trust feedback is needed to improve trust results. Again
most of the trust management systems that have been evaluated do not provide security at the access
control and communication level. However, attacks can come from system users themselves. The
situation is accentuated in cloud environments due to the dynamic interactions and the distributed
nature of cloud services, which make it difficult to identify attackers. Mitigation techniques are required
to enhance end user trust. Some of the works, compared the low-level performance metrics of Cloud
services such as CPU utilization and network throughput. Such low-level performance metrics can be
further used to create models of high-level system properties, such as power consumption and
performance. Weightings can be added to reflect each service provider protective mechanism capability
and the provision of the different attributes such as security, privacy, and performance measurements.
Considerable literature exists on trust models in Cloud computing that evaluates the trust of Cloud
services. The detailed analysis concludes that all the trust models in Cloud computing are mainly
designed to evaluate the trust between Cloud CS and CSPs. None of these trust models focus on
evaluation and establishment of trust in the inter-Cloud domain; thus the Cloud federation lacks trust
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evaluation approaches and techniques. After analysing these trust models, it is further concluded that
trust evaluation should not be based on single factor (feedback, SLA or recommendation) rather a trust
value should be the aggregation of these different factors. Keeping in view the potential growth of Cloud
federation and the need for trust evaluation model to achieve the trusted federation (Kanwal, Masood,
& Shibli, 2014), a trust evaluation model that is based on two essential factors of feedback and QoP
attributes in SLAs is required. From this model a single metric may be generated for end user trust.
As an outcome for the literature survey, it is noted at there are few research articles that focus on the
evaluation of cloud identity providers or on finding appropriate solutions to establish confidence and
trust between the consumers and the cloud identity provider. The implications for trust frameworks are
that the start on any proposal will be with an inadequate literature foundation. Guidelines for evaluating
trust in the cloud environment need to begin with a fresh assessment of the context and a recognition of
the differences between a cloud environment context and all previous computing contexts, including
grid networks.
At present there are no unified standards or metric frameworks that span the cloud context. The
evaluation of trust, the building of trust models, and the design of trust frameworks can decrease the
complexity of the cloud environment by delegating decision-making to measurable attributes within the
systems framework. To evaluate the trust of service nodes scientifically needs a new framework and
evaluation method to determine the weight of different indexes, and fully reflect the objectivity and
accuracy in cloud authentication contexts. The outstanding problem is that current research of trust
evaluation is still in its infancy, and it still has a considerable problem space to explore and to resolve.
The end user requires less information and more evidence that their information is secure. The required
evidence is a holistic grouping from multiple factors that is to be accessible for decision-making. A whole
evaluation framework for trust evaluation, is required which can help users choose and to monitor the
cloud identity provider states and demonstrations of trusted behavior. Some of the metrics would
include trust effectiveness measures such as uncertainty, aggregation and customization. Moreover,
there is no framework that can allow CIdUs to evaluate CIdPs services and rank them based on their
ability to meet the CIdU’s requirements. A Cloud trust framework is a desirable innovation but
challenges still remained for security, privacy, access control, and integration; and these continue to be
major weaknesses inhibiting cloud end user decision making.

7 Conclusion
The end user of Cloud services requires greater evidence on which to base trusting decisions regarding
service supply. The complexity of the situation is compounded by the nature of the cloud environment
that allows a service supplier to move between contractual arrangements and jurisdictions regardless of
where the end user may be located. In the literature reviewed a gap was identified around the evaluation
of trust and its attributes in Cloud services. Several solutions were reviewed that provide metrics to
determine the credibility of trust in cloud environments. The trust value metric is particularly useful
once the assessment methodology is a formalized. The focus on cloud identity was selected as this is a
key area where privacy and security are critical. The unpredictable number of cloud service consumers
and highly dynamic nature of cloud environments accentuate the problem of intercommunicating
obstacles occurring among CIdPs and CIdUs. The evidence an end user looks for, can be compiled from
a fair assessment of service provider attributes and their security mechanisms. Trust-based modelling
provides a solution from which a trust framework may be developed to assure a trustworthy foundation
for decision-making. Further research is required into optimal framework architectures, the assessment
criteria and the adequacy of feedback and review loops. Also the composition of trust models ought to
be open for evaluation so the relative strengths and weaknesses of each may be reported to the end user
as part of the evidence on which decisions may be made.
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